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Abstract
How to integrate artificial intelligence (AI) technologies in the functioning
and structures of our society has become a concern of contemporary
politics and public debates. In this paper, we investigate national AI stra-
tegies as a peculiar form of co-shaping this development, a hybrid of policy
and discourse that offers imaginaries, allocates resources, and sets rules.
Conceptually, the paper is informed by sociotechnical imaginaries, the
sociology of expectations, myths, and the sublime. Empirically we analyze AI
policy documents of four key players in the field, namely China, the United
States, France, and Germany. The results show that the narrative con-
struction of AI strategies is strikingly similar: they all establish AI as an
inevitable and massively disrupting technological development by building
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on rhetorical devices such as a grand legacy and international competition.
Having established this inevitable, yet uncertain, AI future, national leaders
proclaim leadership intervention and articulate opportunities and distinct
national pathways. While this narrative construction is quite uniform, the
respective AI imaginaries are remarkably different, reflecting the vast
cultural, political, and economic differences of the countries under study. As
governments endow these imaginary pathways with massive resources and
investments, they contribute to coproducing the installment of these
futures and, thus, yield a performative lock-in function.
Keywords
artificial intelligence, sociotechnical imaginaries, governance, discourse anal-
ysis, international comparison
Introduction
Technology is the answer . . . but what was the question?
Cedric Price (1966)
Facing the current rush toward artificial intelligence (AI) by private tech
companies such as Google, Facebook, Baidu, or Alibaba, and current public
media attention for the subject, governments around the globe have pro-
claimed to partake in a global AI race (Dutton 2018). In recent years,
national AI strategies and regulatory initiatives have been popping up all
around the globe. As AI seems to penetrate all spheres of life, governments
are on the spot as regulators, articulating potentials, risks, and ethical chal-
lenges that go along with current AI developments. Scholars and consul-
tancies have compared and assessed national AI policy papers under the
economic frame of “AI competitiveness” and “AI readiness” (Cambrian
Futures 2019; Dutton 2018). But these documents do more than merely set
rules: they constitute a powerful and peculiar hybrid of policy and dis-
course. They employ a prose of sober tech-policy, fierce national strategic
positioning, and, at the same time, sketch bold visions of public goods and
social order enabled through AI.
This paper portrays a comparative qualitative analysis of national AI
strategy papers in order to unravel these visions and to deconstruct different
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idealizations of statehood and algorithmic culture. Notwithstanding the
apparent differences in the substantial content of national imaginaries, the
key findings suggest a surprising consistency in the narrative of these stra-
tegies, converting bold and vague policy talk into a seemingly inevitable
technological pathway.
The Integration of AI into Society in Public
and Academic Discourse
Topically, this work is situated at the intersection of AI and society that
investigates from different angles the coming into being of AI as a key
sociotechnical institution of the twenty-first century. Long before the cur-
rent hype, scholars in sociology and history of science have already studied
multiple cycles of hypes and “AI winters” (Bostrom 2014) and extensively
documented and analyzed the social construction of knowledge, scientific
practices, and expertise in AI (Woolgar 1985; Courtial and Law 1989;
Collins 1993; Suchman 2007). More recent work has stressed that machine
learning is far from indifferent to human interaction (Bechmann and Bow-
ker 2019; Castelle 2020), providing detailed ethnographies of technological
cultures in AI research (Mackenzie 2017) and mapping the trajectories of
competing subfields (Cardon, Cointet, and Mazières 2018). Particularly
relevant for the present work, scholars have highlighted the constitutive
role of metaphors, myths, and rhetoric: metaphors such as artificial
“intelligence” or machine “learning” guide the societal discourse sustain-
ably and fuel fantasies and future visions in the broader public just as much
as in expert communities (Campolo and Crawford 2020; Natale and Balla-
tore 2017). Popular AI discourse also strongly rests on long-standing motifs
of human-like machines in mythical storytelling and science fiction (Bory
2019; Cave and Dihal 2019).
In existing studies of media reporting and fictional representation of AI,
scholars have identified coverage that primarily showcases the latest high-
tech products and services. Here, business actors feature much more often
in AI reporting than other stakeholders (Brennen, Howard, and Nielsen
2018; Chuan, Tsai, and Cho 2019; Fast and Horvitz 2017). This industry
agenda-setting favors an overhyped vision of AI, resulting in a public focus
on potentials of AI and neglecting its actual methodological limitations
(Elish and boyd 2018). Recent studies of media coverage of AI in China
reveal a similar dominance of the private sector in propagating positive
discourses around AI but also stronger government propagation (Zeng,
Chan, and Schäfer 2020).
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Scholars have also started to track and analyze the recent uptake of
regulatory initiatives on AI across the globe but particularly in Europe,
Northern America, and Asia (Daly et al. 2019; Niklas and Dencik 2020).
This literature analyses regulatory measures and investments, foreground-
ing ethics as a normative framework (Jobin, Ienca, and Vayena 2019).
While this rise of ethical guidelines certainly constitutes a strategic move
by the corporate sector to escape actual regulation (Wagner 2018), it also
functions as a tool for governance, at least by shaping the very understand-
ing of AI and its normative challenges (Larsson 2020).
In sum, the literature on AI’s integration into society articulates a strong
role for discourse in shaping the present and future sociotechnical path-
ways. Interestingly, scholars have not yet analyzed governmental position-
ing on AI and its role in future imaginary production. Certainly,
governments are impacted by public and private narratives, but, in turn,
they are themselves powerful players in shaping our perception and expec-
tation of AI.
Conceptual Frame: Sociotechnical Imaginaries (SIs),
Myths, and the Sublime
In this paper, we approach national AI policy and strategy papers as a
peculiar hybrid of policy and discourse. They are at the same time tech
policy, national strategic positioning, and an imaginary of public and pri-
vate goods. In most cases, they sketch broad visions and ambitions but also
allocate resources to AI research, list already issued policies and regula-
tions, and present roadmaps for future measures and initiatives. Such a
complex interplay asks for a conceptual frame that can do justice to this
intricate relation of discourse, politics, and technology. For this reason, our
research builds on existing concepts in science and technology studies, such
as ‘SIs,’ but also strongly draws on political theory, sociology, anthropol-
ogy, and communication and rhetoric studies.
In recent years, Science and Technology Studies (STS) has increas-
ingly become interested in the conjunction of discourse and the making
of politics and technology (Mager and Katzenbach 2021). Scholars
study “expectations and stories about the future” (van Lente and Rip
1998; van Lente 2016), the role of technological innovations, and
visionary rhetoric in enterprises (Beckert 2016) and highlight the dis-
cursive struggles around “contested futures” (Brown, Rappert, and Web-
ster 2017). Authors have also investigated the role of futurist narratives
and myths, particular regarding the internet and online activities (Flichy
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2007; Mansell 2012; Mosco 2005). These “vanguard visions” (Hilgart-
ner 2015) and the rhetorics of “pioneer communities” (Hepp 2020) are
now receiving increasing attention in studies of the making of digital
futures. With even more attention to language and words, scholars in
linguistics, media, and communications have looked at metaphors (Lak-
off and Johnson 1980) and their relation to technology (Wyatt 2017). In
sum, these studies show that novel technology and science discoveries
are regularly linked to modernist narratives of progress, especially in
liberal capitalist and communist state systems that depend on technol-
ogy as a means for market innovation and social engineering. In turn,
looking at technology narratives serves as a means to look into desired
futures, informing us about societal strivings and aspirations.
At the nexus of politics, discourse, and technology, the concept of SIs
(Jasanoff and Kim 2009) has explicitly foregrounded the role of the state.
The authors assert that sustaining imaginaries are always “associated with
active exercises of state power, such as the selection of development prio-
rities, the allocation of funds, the investment in material infrastructures”
(Jasanoff and Kim 2009, 123). While subsequent research has shown that
imaginaries are routinely rather multiple, contested, and commodified than
uniform visions of the state (Mager and Katzenbach 2021; Jasanoff 2015),
the role of the state remains crucial. It has the capacity to structure future
expectations by combining powerful measures of issuing regulations and
allocating resources with its own narratives and visions. State actors possess
the (legitimate) means to sketch future societal pathways and, at the same
time, craft influential institutions that define the virtues and vices facilitated
by novel technologies and culture.
In the analysis, we substantiate this high-level concept with, firstly,
Mosco’s (2005) concept of myths as structuration devices for sociotechnical
ordering. With Mosco, the power of myths (such as the apparently always
imminent advent of “general AI”) does not stem from their level of truth-
fulness: “myths are neither true nor false, but living or dead ( . . . ). To
understand a myth involves more than proving it to be false. It means
figuring out why the myth exists, why it is so important to people, what
it means, and what it tells us about people’s hopes and dreams” (p. 29).
Hence, debunking myths as sole superstition and simple nonsense would
disregard their proper social function. Instead, the deconstruction of suc-
cessful myths brings to the forefront present desires and values as well the
underlying power structures. Barthes (1972) pointed out that myths inhabit
a concealing and escapist function, serving to bridge contradictions in soci-
ety and to escape routine everyday life. Most importantly, this implies a
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process of depoliticization: the narratives of successful myths massively
reduce complexity and decouple developments from their social contexts
and power structures. In consequence, myths push human and institutional
agency to the background by imagining an unconstrained as-if world of
possibilities. This rhetorical function, as the analysis will unravel, is very
present in SIs of AI.
For reconstructing and explaining the awe that is often evoked by tech-
nological progress, Marx (2000) and Nye (2004) have coined the term
technological sublime. The Romantics used the figure of the sublime to
describe how natural phenomena and the riddles of physics evoke a feeling
of overwhelming grandeur and astonishment. During the nineteenth cen-
tury, with its early engineering masterpieces such as the railway, the sub-
lime is increasingly “directed toward technology or, rather, the
technological conquest of matter” (Marx 2000, 197). Evoking this techno-
logical sublime embodies the celebration of technological progress and
conceals its problems and contradictions (Marx 2000, 207). As the upcom-
ing analysis will show, this figure can be presently found in the historical
framing of AI and help to understand how the agency can be shed away
from humans and projected onto AI.
Lastly, we will refer to a greater body of literature regarding the
sociology of expectations in order to explain the performative role of
the articulation of hopes and fears projected on AI (Beckert 2016; van
Lente 2016; van Lente and Rip 1998) in the policy texts at hand. When
visions around novel S&T projects are announced, they are often
embedded in a rhetoric of prospective potentials that innovation sets
free. This rhetoric not only enduringly frames the perception of business
and customers for a technology but also creates an element of performa-
tivity. “Expectations can be seen to be fundamentally ‘generative’, they
guide activities, provide structure and legitimation, attract interest and
foster investment” (Borup et al. 2006, 285–286). What begins as a bold
promise, as we will see in the rhetoric analysis of the AI imaginaries,
can quickly set free a notion of requirement and necessity—a powerful
rhetorical motif urging figures to deliver on the promises. In concert,
these conceptual frameworks will jointly function as sensitizing concepts
for the following analysis that will focus on both the narratives (The
Narratives of National AI Strategies: Talking AI into Being section) and
the substantial imaginaries (The Imaginaries of National AI Strategies
and Their Performative Politics section) articulated in national AI strat-
egy papers.
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Methods: Toward an In-depth Discourse Analysis of AI
Tech-policy Strategies
In recent years, numerous countries around the world have been advancing
national AI strategy papers. In this paper, we focus on the AI strategies of
China, the United States, France, and Germany. This choice of countries is
not exhaustive (Daly et al. 2019; Niklas and Dencik 2020), but it entails key
players in the field. Their published AI strategies have received broad
international attention, they feature industries and companies that are lead-
ing in AI tech development, and these countries share a geopolitical and
economic positioning in the world that influences AI development far
beyond their borders. The United States and China claim leadership in the
global AI race; while France and Germany represent the most powerful
nation-states and economies in the European Union with distinct
approaches to AI deployment.
The strategy documents are special in various regards. Firstly, they are
not set in stone but are subject to substantive updates, adjustments, or even
radical dismissals and reorientations. Just as in other political fields, tech
policy adapts to political situations and is largely affected by changes in
government, for example, after the 2016 elections in the United States,
where, ever since the Trump delegation took office, a substantially different
stance on AI has been taken. Further, AI strategies are often not limited
to one condensed official document or even one type of medium alone.
Documents that receive the status of a strategy paper can entail summary
reports of summit conference proceedings (2018 White House Summit on
AI for American Industry [WHSum]; cf. Table 1), announcements of state
councils (A Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan
[NgDpl]), or reports by national expert groups (VilRp). These different
media and forms of AI strategies already reflect distinct national political
institutional cultures and complicate the identification of one single type of
document as a reference. Pragmatically, in our analysis, we include any
document that was officially labeled and published as an AI strategy doc-
ument by a current government in charge between 2016 and 2020 in the four
countries, needing to fulfill the minimum requirement to contain some
policy measures on how to steer AI present and future (an exception is
made with the United States which has experienced a very recent power
shift with the Biden administration taking over in 2021). A list of the
documents we collected and analyzed can be found in Table 1.
Methodologically, we place this work in the hermeneutical tradition of
the study of technological imaginations (e.g., Verschraegen et al. 2017) and
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































vision assessment (e.g., Grin and Grunwald 2000), stemming from the
technology assessment and the larger STS community (see an overview
by Konrad et al. 2016). The content-based analysis of rhetorical motives
represents an analytical explorative method, building on a rich pool of
empirical examples that investigate the narratives, constellations, and pro-
cess dynamics in the construction of contested futures (e.g., Lösch, Armin,
and Meister 2019; Roßmann 2020). As a research design, we employ a
cross-national comparison of countries (Jasanoff 2015, 24). Such a com-
parative approach not only discloses the formation of the articulated narra-
tives and SIs but especially sheds light on the similarities, differences, and
particularities found in each national articulation. We employ an interpre-
tative discourse analysis that does not primarily focus on content (policy,
funding, or regulation announcements, etc.) but instead focuses on the
underlying argumentative meta-structure and the resulting imaginaries.
To comprehend this construction process, we take into account rhetorical
devices and narrative figures such as the technological sublime, myths, and
the performative force of expectations as introduced before.
We display and analyze how policy documents merge a highly interpre-
tative flexible technology cluster such as AI and a rather vague and con-
tested discourse into a seemingly inevitable and sometimes even desirable
technological pathway. For this aim, we initially undertook a close reading
of all the policy documents listed above, independent of national origin,
identifying core issues and themes in the depiction of the current national
situation of AI present and future. Secondly, we clustered these themes,
unraveling them as central rhetorical building blocks (the inevitability of
AI, the necessity of AI, uncertainty, and leadership), which are present
across all countries independent of the resulting national imaginaries.
Thirdly, we investigated the relationship among these building blocks,
understanding them as a coherent (but not necessarily linear) narrative that
leads to the specific AI imaginary of each nation.
The Narratives of National AI Strategies: Talking
AI into Being
In this section and the following, we will firstly portray the common narra-
tive building blocks (Between Rupture and Legacy: The Inevitability of AI,
International Competitiveness and the Interdependence of Technology and
Societal Good: The Necessity of AI, and Uncertainty and Leadership:
Articulating Hopes and Fears of Technological Advancement subsections)
resulting from our analysis. Thereafter, we briefly sketch the different
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national imaginaries as projections of political culture and social order
enabled through AI (AI for Humanity and a Cybernetic Control System:
Different Imaginaries subsection) and their performative effect resulting in
potential lock-in pathways (Lock-in, Path-dependency, and Performative
Politics subsection; cf. Figure 1).
Between Rupture and Legacy: The Inevitability of AI
As a first step of the narrative construction of the AI imaginary, multiple
themes can be detected in the strategy papers that convert AI into
an inevitable technological pathway.
To set the stage, political leaders situate their societies in a historical
context in relation to AI technology. Either such historical context is por-
trayed as a seemingly unprecedented rupture that transcends any former
societal experience or as a rupture that stands in a legacy of past historical
transformations. Both historical motives turn current technological AI
development into an autonomous agent, a determinist force that breaks over
our societies. For example, the Chinese document comments: “The rapid
development of artificial intelligence (AI) will profoundly change human
society and life and change the world” (NgDpl, 2). Further, AI is portrayed
as marking a turning point in world history with US president Trump
proclaiming: “We’re on the verge of new technological revolutions that
could improve virtually every aspect of our live, create vast new wealth
for American workers and families, and open up bold, new frontiers in
science, medicine, and communication” (WHSum, quote Trump, 5). Here,
AI is depicted as a breakthrough, a revolution, almost a sublime force that
lets society enter a new epoch in history. Current transformation is cele-
brated as a rupture that knows no precedent. In such a context of invoked
technological hype, “disjunctive aspects of technological change are often
emphasized and continuities with the past are erased from promissory
memory” (Borup et al. 2006, 290). Through negating historical continuities,
the strategy documents are able to create a myth of a radical break. They
suggest a momentum and Zeitgeist of exception, evoking the perception
that current transformations will seemingly make everything different, an
unforeseen revolution that penetrates every pore of society and makes past
reassurances shaky and obsolete. Such denial of history provokes the use of
metaphors and images of grandeur that need to underline the current state
of exception. Brown et al. (2017) comment in this context: “when the future
can no longer be expected to follow on neatly from the past, then imagina-
tive means must be employed” (p. 8). Obscuring past pathways in

















































technological development necessarily purifies (excessively glorifies) and
simplifies (reduces or denies social complexity) technological reality. Here,
Mosco (2005) stresses: “The denial of history is central to understanding
myth as depoliticized speech because to deny history is to remove from
discussion active human agency, the constraints of social structure, and the
real world of politics” (p. 35).
Legacy of historical transformations. But the rhetoric of a transcendence of
history alone cannot evoke a “breakthrough” perception of AI technology.
Analogies and referral to a grand historical legacy equally function to
celebrate an upcoming revolution that disrupts humanity. In such a manner,
US Deputy Assistant for technological development Kratsios envisions:
“Generation after generation, American innovation has benefited our peo-
ple and the entire world. American oil fueled world industries. American
medicine conquered diseases. [ . . . ] Today, with so many of the mysteries
of quantum computing, autonomous systems, and machine learning yet to
be discovered, we can take hold of the future and make it our own”
(WHSum, 11). And in a similar tone, the Chinese paper states: “AI has
become the core driving force for a new round of industrial transformation,
[which] will advance the release of the huge energy stored from the previ-
ous scientific and technological revolution and industrial transformation,
and create a new powerful engine, reconstructing production, distribution,
exchange, consumption, and so on (NgDpl, 2 f.).
Here, AI is situated in the linear and coherent promise of historical
progress, building upon a legacy of a glorious past. In this context, Jasanoff
(2015) comments “technological systems serve on this view a doubly deic-
tic function, pointing back at past cultural achievements and ahead to
promising and attainable futures, or to futures to be shunned and avoided”
(p. 22). Connecting technological innovations with rhetoric of past revolu-
tions is a strategic move to foster technological celebration, the technolo-
gical sublime (Marx 2000; Nye 1996). The case of AI sublimation involves
hyperbolic statements of technological success, alignment with a national
memory of past achievements and a rhetoric of progress that includes the
domination over nature or competitors, as well as the conquest over the
impossible: “Reference to history and culture can also take the form of
analogies to technological success in other fields, which is seen as proof
that developments believed to be impossible can actually be realized”
(Beckert 2016, 181). At the same time, such accentuation of a historical
legacy suggests a notion of human passivity and impotence as we stand still
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in awe to contemplate the pathway of a “natural” and “meant to be” his-
torical technological progress that sweeps over our societies.
Such narratives lend agency to technology that transcends human con-
trol, confronting society with a seemingly all-pervasive and inevitable
development (Brown et al. 2016; Winner 1978) while obscuring the con-
tingencies and power relations of human interaction in the social, political,
and economic realm on which any technological development depends.
Once an agency is attributed to a technology, and political officials, eco-
nomic players, and media coverage adapt such discourse, human agency is
suddenly reduced to adaption, reaction, or mitigation: “the force implied in
this attribution of agency is that one can either ride the wave of advance-
ment or drown in the waves of progress!” (Brown, Rappert, and Webster
2016, 9). French president Macron employs this motive powerfully by
stating: “This revolution will not happen in 50 or 60 years, it is happening
today, it is really on its track, ( . . . ) we have to choose, we have to make
certain decisions, given the fact that the technical and the social side is
radical and the economic as well” (Speech Macron at the Collège de France
[SpMcr]). Nye (2004) highlights that “the most successful of these little
narratives are those that present an innovation as not just desirable, but
inevitable” (p. 160). Hence, the myth of an inevitable pathway toward AI
is created through a play with history that glorifies a seemingly present
technological rupture or points at a continuation of a grand legacy, while at
the same time negating the role of human agency in such technological
development.
International Competitiveness and the Interdependence
of Technology and Societal Good: The Necessity of AI
The notion of inevitability is fostered not only through the motive of tech-
nological determinism, but equally through the pressure of international
competitiveness, harnessed within a discourse of capitalist and geopolitical
striving for strategic advantage. In the rhetorical construction of an inevi-
table technological pathway, political leaders establish an interdependent
connection between technology advancement, economic performance, and
the resilience capabilities of a society. This creates a powerful rhetorical
triangle that sheds pivotal attention and necessity to AI, lifting it into a
sublime aura of a savior. The Chinese NgDpl proclaims: “AI has become a
new focus of international competition. AI is a strategic technology that will
lead in the future; the world’s major developed countries are taking the
development of AI as a major strategy to enhance national competitiveness
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and protect national security” (p. 2). Facing such fierce international com-
petition, the United States and France emphasize their current strategic
position in the market. The French Villani report stresses that “It is vital
to take advantage of our economy’s comparative advantages and its areas of
excellence in order to bolster the French and European artificial intelligence
ecosystem” (VilRp, 9). The United States, defending its role as a worldwide
leader, makes clear: “America has been the global leader in AI, and the
Trump Administration will ensure our great Nation remains the global
leader in AI” (WHSum, 8). And further: “Failure to adopt AI will result
in legacy systems irrelevant to the defense of our people, eroding cohesion
among allies and partners, reduced access to markets that will contribute to
a decline in our prosperity and standard of living, and growing challenges to
societies that have been built upon individual freedoms” (DoDAIStr, 5).
The recent Biden administration, which took over power only this year,
continues this narrative by stating: “America’s economic prosperity hinges
on foundational investments in our technological leadership” (National
Artificial Intelligence Research Resource Task Force [AIRRTF]).
Last but not least, German Hightech strategy paper alerts in a tone
of prey and predator: “Even more than in all previous transformations, in
this phase of digitalisation the fast beat the slow. The winners will be
those who open up new markets early and quickly set their own standards”
(Hightechstr, 8 f.).
No matter if packed in a rhetoric of “catching up,” “defending the pole
position,” or scenarios of “brute survival,” capitalist competition about
market shares and military strivings for geopolitical hegemony fostered
through advancement in AI technology are portrayed as of pivotal impor-
tance. When such advancement is linked to societal resilience as a whole,
technology becomes the crucial tool to master societal challenges or even
acts as a yardstick to indicate present status of civilization. Now, technology
receives the status of a sublime redeemer that has to be fostered and har-
nessed. If successful, such a positioning of technology results in an “an aura
of indelible pragmatic necessity,” as Winner (1978) notes, and “to ignore
these demands, or to leave them insufficiently fulfilled, is to attack the very
foundations on which modern social order rests” (p. 259). Consequently,
these narratives elevate AI to become a core demand of society in its
entirety, an essential societal good nobody can be deprived of.
Technological advancement acts as an essential pillar of civilizing prog-
ress in modern capitalist societies. If a “breakthrough” technology such as
AI is detected, while at the same time nations locate themselves in an arena
of fierce international competition, politicians magnify the potential of AI
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to leapfrog economic growth in order to defend (or attain) the nation’s
global position. Once more, just as with the motive of technological deter-
minism, the advancement of AI now seems vital as the resilience of an
entire society depends on it. If the economy, security, and, accordingly,
societal order as a whole are at stake, so the narrative suggests, only
advancement in AI technology can assure that the current level of living
can be maintained and future prosperity secured.
Uncertainty and Leadership: Articulating Hopes and Fears
of Technological Advancement
Standing at the verge of such a dramatic historical moment, the conse-
quences are hard to foresee. In the next building block of the construction
of AI narratives, national leaders detect prospective potentials, opportuni-
ties, challenges, and risks that go along the “inevitable” pathway toward AI
and establish a need for leadership.
For China, AI contains the promise of a remedy, projecting hopes of a
“technological fix” to social problems: “AI brings new opportunities for
social construction. China is currently in the decisive stage of comprehen-
sively constructing a moderately prosperous society. The challenges of
population aging, environmental constraints, etc. remain serious” (NgDpl,
3). In consequence, the Chinese government purports the need for strong
leadership: “We must strengthen organizational leadership, complete
mechanisms, take aim at objectives, keep tasks closely in view, realistically
grasp implementation with a spirit of hammering nails, and carry out the
blueprint to the end” (NgDpl, 27). Similarly, in the United States, Kratsios
sketches a glorious possible future: “Artificial intelligence holds the prom-
ise of great benefits for American workers, with the potential to improve
safety, increase productivity, and create new industries we can’t yet
imagine” (WHSum, Speech Kratsios, 9). Here, leadership is more distrib-
uted: “To realize the full potential of AI for the American people, it will
require the combined efforts of industry, academia, and government. That is
why we are all here today” (WHSum, Speech Kratsios, 8). The German
strategy aims to turn the challenges of the transformative rupture of AI into
fruitful potentials: “the challenges faced by Germany, as in other countries,
involve shaping the structural changes driven by digitalisation and taking
place in business, the labour market and society and leveraging the potential
which rests in AI technologies” (kiStr, 10). The French strategy stresses the
ambivalent character of this AI revolution. President Macron positions
himself ready for delivering on these challenges: “(A)s you have
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understood, you can count on me—I say it here without any innocence—to
build the true renaissance that Europe needs” (SpMcr).
While the first two rhetorical themes have downplayed human agency,
this third motif brings a new spin to the shared narrative. All strategy papers
suggest that future trajectories are undetermined, voicing lofty articulations
of hopes and fears rather than clear-cut answers of what the future of AI will
bring. This nebulosity serves as a rhetoric that prompts national leaders
back into the arena of action. van Lente (2016) highlights that such
“statements about future technological performance [ . . . ] [serve to] mobi-
lize attention, guide efforts and legitimate actions” (p. 46). Upon closer
inspection, this spin toward leadership and human agency constitutes a
somewhat inconsistent departure from the previous narrative elements of
technological determinism and inevitability. If one depicts technological
progress as a determinist and historical force by employing vocabulary that
suggest human paralysis such as “overwhelming revolution” or “sudden
breakthrough,” it is hard to see where there is leeway for decision makers’
agency to shape current and future transformations. Rhetorically, though,
the articulation of expectations, hopes, and fears provokes a mobilizing
momentum. It serves to open a window of incertitude, which invites for
clarification and enables leadership intervention. It offers a suitable oppor-
tunity for national leaders to demand initiative and uncritical commitment
to coproduce the very futures they envision. Here, “expectations are wishful
enactments of a desired future. By performing such futures, they are made
real and in this sense expectations can be understood as performative”
(Borup et al. 2006, 286).
No matter if a sketched vision or a proclaimed expectation will ever be
achieved, it powerfully shapes the discourse. If such political framing is
negative, emphasizing the risks and fears that go along the “unstoppable”
technological train of progress, then national leaders are put into an inter-
vening role as saviors who can responsibly interfere or at least mitigate
worst-case scenarios. Through such rhetoric, also rather less favorable deci-
sions are easy to justify, as confronted with a bleak doomsday scenario
(e.g., AI eradicating billions of jobs, AI technology provoking an inter-
national arms race), stakeholders are rather willing to bite the bullet. Like-
wise, though, the myth of a shiny AI future (e.g., the great vision of
unprecedented economic growth, the automation of all tedious labor
through AI) is a handy means to trigger an uncontested rushing toward a
simplified and innocent golden future, often setting aside the social, polit-
ical, and economic complexities, contradictions, and pitfalls that go along
the new innovation.
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In sum, AI’s political rhetoric about hopes and fears is far from being
informative alone. First and foremost, it is constitutive as it frames dis-
courses and (im)possibilities; it is enabling as it allows political activity
(also in the face of a looming threat); it can be disguising as it leaves
unpleasant societal side effects and questions about power structures
unmentioned and finally also (de)legitimizing, bestowing legitimacy upon
political leaders or social institutions—or authorizing certain standpoints or
disapproving or condemning others (e.g., cherish technological progress
against a “cynical cultural pessimism” or “reactionary Luddism”).
The Imaginaries of National AI Strategies and Their
Performative Politics
As we have shown, the narrative construction of the national AI strategies
are strikingly similar. Yet, their substantial imaginaries are remarkably
different, which is probably not surprising given the vast cultural, political,
and economic differences of the countries under study. States offer future
pathways and at the same time endow these visions with massive resources
and investments. As a result, these imaginaries not only reflect on and offer
sociotechnical trajectories but, at the same time, coproduce the installment
of these futures and, thus, yield a performative function.
AI for Humanity and a Cybernetic Control System: Different
Imaginaries
Germany, for example, focuses on AI applications in the manufacturing
industry (also branded as AI made in Germany) and promotes an AI ima-
ginary along ethical lines: “We want to use the potential of AI further to
improve security, efficiency and sustainability in particularly important
fields of application whilst also promoting social and cultural participation,
freedom of action and self-determination for each and every citizen”
(Nationale KI-Strategie, 9). Here, the German state commits to rather vague
normative goals, nonetheless demanding commitment to the promises AI
brings along. AI is connected to demands currently en vogue on political
agendas, such as security (facing potential cyber and terrorist attacks),
efficiency (facing international economic competition), and sustainability
(facing the current threat of pollution and global warming). Even though not
explained in detail, such terms are linked to liberal core values such as
inclusion, freedom of action and autonomy, resembling the stark reference
to the German constitutional framework in the German AI strategy papers.
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In a similar vein, the French strategy commits to a humanist ethos,
stressing to push AI into sectors that enable human flourishing: “[AI]
Industrial policy must focus on the main issues and challenges facing our
era, including the early detection of pathologies, P4 medicine, medical
deserts and zero-emission urban mobility” (AI for Humanity web page).
Further, Macron announces, “basically, we return to a new, very Cartesian
stage of this faculty of being master and possessor of nature, and it is in this
responsibility that we must always situate our action [ . . . ]. It is a moral
responsibility, it is also the guarantee that our democracies will not suc-
cumb in some way to an Orwellian syndrome where technology is no longer
an instrument of freedom, but a form of control authority” (SpMcr). In
grand style, Macron portrays humanity as being at a turning point. The
ostentatious presentation of his humanist vision is underlined by figures
of philosophy and mythology (Descartes, Prometheus) and serves to create
an imaginary of a moral bastion, offering the promise of technological
advancement enabling humanist progress. AI is embedded in a philanthro-
pic imaginary to overcome the pressing threats of humanity. It is blessed
with an aura comparable to an undeniable fundamental right, a public good,
a remedy that can relieve humanity from the vices of our era with the latest
innovative technological achievements. Besides such philanthropic narra-
tives, the Villani report claims that inside these transformative sectors,
France can draw on its “economy’s comparative advantages and areas of
excellence” (VilRp, 9).
The United States takes a remarkably different stance on AI: “Artificial
intelligence holds tremendous potential as a tool to empower the American
worker, drive growth in American industry, and improve the lives of the
American people. Our free-market approach to scientific discovery
harnesses the combined strengths of government, industry, and academia,
and uniquely positions us to leverage this technology for the betterment of
our great nation” (WHSum, 2). Under the Trump administration, the vision
of AI is articulated as an act of patriotism, equalizing the technological
advancement of the American nation with the advancement of society as a
whole. In this context, the term AI serves to unravel essential core values
the Trump delegation regards as pivotal, such as empowerment of the
American worker, strengthening local industry, or fostering a deregulating
free-market approach. In contrast to the French statist vision, the Trump
administration aims at removing barriers to AI Innovation “wherever and
whenever we can to let American industry, American thinkers, and Amer-
ican workers reach their greatest potential” (speech Kratsios, WHSum, 11).
The current Biden administration follows this nationalist narrative by
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stressing: “The National AI Research Resource will expand access to the
resources and tools that fuel AI research and development, opening oppor-
tunities for bright minds from across America to pursue the next break-
throughs in science and technology” (AIRRTF). In the US version, AI
embodies the free spirit of American scientific ingenuity, the dedication
of hardworking people in the rust belt, the competitive economic strength of
a proud nation building on a long tradition of narratives of progress and
America’s culture of greatness (Marx 2000; Nye 1996).
Lastly, the Chinese AI imaginary points again in a different direction,
with the Chinese Communist Party depicting AI as a tool for establishing
social order and regulation: “Based on the goal of improving people’s
living standards and quality, speed up and deepen the applications of AI,
increase the level of intelligentization of the whole society to form an
all-encompassing and ubiquitous intelligent environment” (NgDpl, 18).
Further, “AI technologies can accurately sense, forecast, and provide
early warning of major situations for infrastructure facilities and social
security operations; grasp group cognition and psychological changes in a
timely manner; and take the initiative in decision-making and reactions—
which will significantly elevate the capability and level of social gov-
ernance, playing an irreplaceable role in effectively maintaining social
stability” (NgDpl, 3). In order to meet such aims, the Chinese government
targets the “smartification” and “intelligentization” of all possible societal
fields. In the Chinese strategy papers, AI is interoven with other high-end
technological buzzwords such as “smart city,” “intelligent robotics,”
“Industry 4.0,” or “facial biometric identification,” sketching a totality of
AI. Such visions of “data behaviorism” (Rouvroy 2013) or cybernetic gov-
ernmentality through “environmental-behavioral control” (Krivý 2018)
embody a SI where social order is established through a perpetual mode
of citizen (self-)monitoring, adaptation, and optimization. The Chinese
vision of AI enabling the “construction of public safety and intelligent
monitoring and early warning and control system” (NgDpl, 20) echoes
Jasanoff’s portrayal of a sociotechnical aspiration for “simplification and
standardization of human subjects so as to govern them more efficiently”
(Jasanoff & Kim 2009, 122).
Lock-in, Path-dependency, and Performative Politics
With their national AI strategies, governments combine the narrative estab-
lishment of a particular moment in time that demands leadership (The
Narratives of National AI Strategies: Talking AI into Being section) with
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steering toward particular, country-dependent pathways (AI for Humanity
and a Cybernetic Control System: Different Imaginaries subsection).
Hence, national leaders seek to convert a field of lofty rhetoric, contingen-
cies, and insecurities into a concrete path of action, aiming at the imple-
mentation of their policies through the performance of responsible
intervention and leadership. By allocating substantial funding for AI
research and business development, establishing normative principles and
hard regulation, they constitute the crucial hinge where ideas, announce-
ments, and visions start to materialize in projects, infrastructures, and orga-
nizations. Thus, the national AI strategies mark the departure point for
country-specific trajectories, driving a process of closure for the integration
of AI into society. This creates a process of path dependency that might
even lead to lock-in effects down the road.
Borup et al. (2006) write that “after a time, or even rather quickly,
expectations may be seen to exhibit certain material and social path depen-
dencies (lock-in or irreversibility)” (p. 293). On the one hand, such a lock-in
phenomenon can be understood as a strategic and desirable outcome for
political advocates of a technology endeavor, as it embodies a successful
manifestation of political will. When implementation has started and path
dependencies are taking place, this also means that doubts and fears have
been refuted, political critiques and opponents silenced, and political action
that pushes into the desired technological direction prevails. Certainly, it is
crucial to stress that, notwithstanding the powerful stakeholders that try to
forward a SI, such as in the case of AI, their final realization and wide
societal embedding will still meet resistance and skepticism, and will meet
unforeseen obstacles, ranging from tedious patent litigations to sudden
governmental downfalls. Hence, the process of political implementation
and social and cultural embedding is anything but a linear progression from
tech talk to technological reality, but a myriad of contested interactions.
Nonetheless, once governments proclaim bold promises, they are on the
spot to deliver and perform their capabilities. Hence, on the flip side of the
path-dependency phenomenon lays the pressure not to disappoint industry
and citizens alike. “When expectations are shared they create a pattern into
which the actors themselves may be locked” (van Lente and Rip 1998, 217).
Such looming risk of lock-in can create additional pressure for the people in
charge to deliver on substantial success. Certainly, at this point, national
leaders are playing with the point of a costly return. “What starts as an
option can be labelled a technical promise, and may subsequently function
as a requirement to be achieved, and a necessity for technologists to work
on, and for others to support” (van Lente and Rip 1998, 216). Politicians are
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able to reinforce established and desirable pathways by demanding the
commitment of society as a whole to an appealing imaginary, but simulta-
neously, their reputation is at stake if they fail to reach their proclaimed
visions.
Conclusion
How to integrate AI technologies into the functioning and structures of our
society has become a concern of contemporary politics and public debates.
In this paper, we have addressed national AI strategies as a peculiar form of
co-shaping this development. Constituting a hybrid of policy and discourse,
governments offer in these documents broad visions and allocate resources
and rules that seek to realize these very visions. We have situated this
analysis in the context of approaches relating communication and future
technology development such as SIs, the sociology of expectations, myths,
and the technological sublime. In the empirical part, we were able to show
that the narrative construction of the national AI strategies is strikingly
similar: they all establish AI as a given and massively disrupting technical
development that will change society and politics fundamentally. In con-
sequence, the necessity to adopt AI across all key sectors of society is
portrayed as taken for granted and inevitable. Yet, governments claim
agency to shape those developments toward their respective goals along
diverse normative principles. While the narrative construction thus is quite
uniform, the respective imaginaries that articulate how to integrate AI into
society and how to shape future developments are remarkably different.
They reflect the vast cultural, political, and economic differences of the
countries under study. Since governments offer future pathways in these
strategy papers and endow these visions with massive resources and invest-
ments, they contribute to coproducing the installment of these futures and,
thus, yield a performative function.
By identifying national AI strategies where ideas, announcements, and
visions start to materialize in projects, infrastructures, and organizations, we
contribute both empirically and conceptually to a better understanding of the
nexus of politics, tech development, and discourse. With AI becoming ever
more deeply integrated into our societies, we need to closely observe and
comment on this process. Recent technological advancements in AI are
severely hyped, and governments contribute to this hype, instead of acting
as critical watchdogs, soberly assessing the risks and potentials. Their fram-
ing of discourses, opinions, and actions are as much enabling as they are
restricting, disclosing a double performative, political role. As Powles (2018)
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comments, “The endgame is always to ‘fix’ A.I. systems, never to use a
different system or no system at all. In accepting the existing narratives about
A.I., vast zones of contest and imagination are relinquished.” This is the
paradox of AI imaginaries: AI tales sound fantastic and trigger our fantasies,
though simultaneously they actually undermine political imagination and
political practice by raising expectations of a comforting technological fix
to structural societal problems. While much of these debates is still quite
controversial, we do seem to witness already a process of closure for a set of
fundamental questions—and the national AI strategies certainly contribute to
this. Today, AI is established as a key sociotechnical institution; it is consid-
ered as taken for granted and inevitable across many sectors already.
With this paper, we set out to systematically analyze the hype production
of an emergent technology like AI. Most probably, the analytical scheme at
hand is not limited to national AI production alone but can also help to
demystify other technological hypes in the past, present, and future such as
nanotechnology, quantum computing, and bioengineering. Such transferabil-
ity is by now of course no more than a further research suggestion that has to
be verified—which goes certainly beyond the scope of this paper. While the
underlying technological functioning of these technologies is obviously
remarkably different, the hopes and fears that are tied to them may be very
similar. Future research clearly needs to further reconstruct how AI and other
emergent technologies have come into being in the twenty-first century. But
this is also the time that we as social science scholars need to contribute to
shaping the debate and the actual developments of the specific future forms of
technology, because discourse clearly matters.
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Krivý, Maroš. 2018. “Towards a Critique of Cybernetic Urbanism: The Smart City
and the Society of Control.” Planning Theory 17 (1): 8-30. doi: 10.1177/1473095
216645631.
Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. 1980. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press. Accessed June 28, 2021. https://press.uchicago.e
du/ucp/books/book/chicago/M/bo3637992.html.
Larsson, Stefan. 2020. “On the Governance of Artificial Intelligence through Ethics
Guidelines.” Asian Journal of Law and Society 7 (3), 437-451. doi: 10.1017/als.
2020.19.
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